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Abstract: 
In this working paper we demonstrate that some of the statistical tests used by Huang and Smith in a 
recent Land Economics article (74(2 1998): 186-202) were erroneous, and raise concerns about their 
corresponding conclusions. Specifically, using data from one of the studies that they showcase, we 
demonstrate that Huang and Smith’s analysis suggesting statistical equality between hypothetical 
dichotomous choice responses and actual contributions is incorrect. We further show that their purported 
equality between dichotomous choice and open-ended response formats is unfounded. Based on these 
analyses we conclude that when real humans make real or stated decisions, the observed procedural 
variance across elicitation methods and the degree of hypothetical bias are more fundamental than relying 
on alternative econometric specifications. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent article, Huang and Smith (1998, hereafter HS) use Monte Carlo simulation 
methods to suggest that the procedural variance observed between open-ended (OE) and 
dichotomous choice (DC) contingent valuation (CV) responses can be attributed to specification 
error in modeling the DC responses. In particular, HS argue that employing alternative 
specifications of the error term for DC responses can provide estimates of mean willingness to 
pay (WTP) that are “virtually identical to the mean of the raw data derived with open-ended CV 
and not significantly different from the mean…for actual purchases” (p. 191). Hence, they claim 
that the evidence from a large body of laboratory and field research that DC-CV question 
formats yield substantially larger estimates of mean WTP than OE response methods is 
“unfounded” (p. 187).  While we applaud the Monte Carlo methods used by HS to demonstrate 
that error specification is important in providing unbiased and accurate estimates of WTP and 
conditional WTP, we wish to caution the reader that alternative specifications of the error term 
are not likely to bridge the gap between OE and DC WTP estimates.  When real humans make 
real or stated decisions, observed procedural variance across elicitation methods and the degree 
of hypothetical bias are more fundamental than relying on alternative econometric specifications. 
To demonstrate this point we roughly follow the organization of the HS paper.  In the 
following section we provide a brief review of the Balistreri et al. (2001) data showcased by HSi.  
This data is used to demonstrate that, in contrast to the HS paper, the mean WTP estimate from 
DC-CV data is significantly different from actual contributions and that the DC and OE 
distributions are significantly different from each other. In the third section we raise concerns 
about the functional forms, error distributions, and welfare estimates used in the Monte Carlo 
 2 
analysis of HS.  Using a broader range of utility-theoretic specifications than the linear logistic 
and probit models employed by HS, we demonstrate that employing alternative error 
specifications is not likely to overcome the observed disparity in mean WTP values across 
elicitation methods. The fourth section addresses concerns about the Turnbull lower bound 
estimator used by HS in support of their not significantly different and virtually identical claims, 
and the increased application of this method to provide “conservative” estimates of mean WTP 
from DC-CV responses.  We conclude with some final thoughts on relying on alternative error 
specifications, rather than seeking a better understanding of human generated responses, to 
measure and correct for procedural variances observed in applied economic research. 
 
II. ON “NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT” AND “VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL” 
 
The Balistreri et al. study compared mean WTP values obtained from an English Auction 
(using real money) with hypothetical DC and OE survey responses for an insurance policy 
against a known loss ($10) with a known probability (40%).  Participants were endowed with 
$80, being actual or hypothetical money depending on whether actual or hypothetical WTP 
values are elicited.  In Table 2 of their paper, HS provide a partial summary of the Balistreri et 
al. results.  Actual values elicited from an English Auction provide a mean WTP of $3.66 with a 
standard deviation of 1.15 (n=52), which is slightly, but significantly, below the expected value 
of $4 for such an insurance policy (t=2.13, p=0.04)ii.  In such an auction prices are raised 
sequentially until the bidding stops (i.e., only one active bidder remains).  This method is 
relatively transparent and incentive compatible for private goods (Davis and Holt, 1993) and 
hence serves as a reference point for assessing hypothetical bias.  In this same table, the mean 
derived from the hypothetical OE responses is $4.58 (standard deviation = $5.38, n=345).  Mean 
WTP values derived from DC responses, wherein the price of the insurance policy is varied 
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across respondents is $5.77 (standard error = $0.26) for the non-negative mean of a linear 
logistic WTP function and $5.63 (standard error = $0.26) using the entire linear logistic 
distribution, including possible negative valuesiii.   Using methods described in Haab and 
McConnell (1997) HS further estimate the non-parametric Turnbull lower bound estimate of the 
mean ($4.56, standard error =$0.31).  Note that in presenting these results we are careful to 
distinguish between the standard deviation of the distribution and the standard error of the mean. 
The above statistics provide enough information to assess the validity of the HS claim 
that DC responses provide a mean WTP estimate that is not significantly different from the 
estimated mean for actual purchases.  Unfortunately, in making this claim, HS do not provide 
information about how this conclusion was reached.  One may conjecture from the statistics 
provided in Table 2 of HS that a difference of means t-test was applied.  A widely adopted form 
of this test, which accommodates unequal sample variances from two independent samples, is 
known as ‘Welsh’s approximate t’. The test statistic is: 
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When this difference of means test is applied to the summary data from the Balistreri et al. study, 
we reach exactly the opposite conclusion than that reached by HS –  even when the lowest 
 4 
possible estimate of the DC response function is used (i.e., the Turnbull lower bound estimate), 
the mean WTP estimate is significantly higher than actual contributions.  The t statistic from this 
test is 2.58 (d.f. = 425.36) resulting in a significance level of p = 0.01.  As such, we maintain that 
the “not statistically different” claim made by HS is itself unfounded.  
In contrast, we concur with HS that the mean WTP estimate derived from DC data using 
the Turnbull Lower Bound method is virtually identical to the raw mean obtained from the OE 
data.  Indeed, if anything, the point estimate for the Turnbull Lower Bound estimate is lower 
than that for the OE data. But does this measure of central tendency really reflect the underlying 
differences in the distributions? We think not. 
In addressing this issue, it is helpful to have additional information on the distributions of 
responses from these two formats.  Table 1 replicates Table 3 in Balistreri et al. (2001): the first 
column indicates the posted price or bid values used in the DC questionnaire, the second column 
indicates the number of responses obtained at each bid value, and the third column provides the 
proportion of DC respondents that “accepted” the posted price.  The last two columns report the 
estimated, rounded number of OE respondents, and corresponding proportions, that would have 
answered yes to each DC value, assuming that respondents would have chosen to buy the 
insurance if the posted price had been less than or equal to their OE valuesiv.  These proportions, 
along with the survival, or reverse cumulative, distribution, of the OE responses are depicted 
graphically in Figure 1.  For reference purposes all OE responses are provided in Appendix 2.   
 From Table 1 and Figure 1, it should be readily apparent that the DC responses 
stochastically dominate the OE responses.  At some of the posted prices the probability 
difference between the two methods is relatively small (e.g., 5.62% at $1), while at others it is 
quite substantial (e.g, 16.14% at $6).   Regardless of magnitude, the fact remains that at every 
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point at which we have a possible comparison, the OE survival function lies below the DC 
survival function.  
Stochastic dominance need not imply significance.  Unfortunately, we have a problem of 
comparability.  The OE survival function is continuous while the DC survival distribution is not. 
To make these two sets of data comparable, either both have to be converted to continuous 
distributions or both have to be converted to discrete functions.  Balistreri et al. followed the 
former approach, rejecting the null hypothesis of equality between OE and DC (p<0.01, 
χ2(2)=15.11) using linear logistic error specifications.   Here, we make use of the converted OE 
values provided in Table 1 and conduct a Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test. We return to 
comparisons associated with continuous distributions in the following section. 
The Smirnov Test (Conover, 1980) can be used to test whether two empirical 
distributions are equal, when the distributions are derived from two mutually independent, 
random samples. Because of the discrete nature of our data, however, this test is conservative 
(Noether, 1967).  The Smirnov Test statistic is exactly the same as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-
statistic:       
    D = max | F (x) – G (x) | 
 
where F(x) and G(x) depicts the DC and OE distributions, respectively. The maximum distance 
between distributions is 0.1614 and occurs at $6. Applying the appropriate formula in Conover 
(1980, p. 473), the large-sample approximation for the critical D0.01 value is 0.12 and so we 
reject the hypothesis of equal distributions beyond the 1% significance level. 
Given these statistical results and the observation that the DC distribution stochastically 
dominates the OE response function, why then did HS get a result in which the estimated mean 
WTP for the DC responses lies below, but not significantly so, the OE mean WTP?  In part the 
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answer lies in the fact that the HS article only considers alternative specifications for the DC 
responses and took the raw mean from the OE as given.   
However, fair and complete tests of comparability necessitates that we consider 
shortcomings and modifications to both sides of the comparison.  Recall, that the raw mean of 
the data is drawn from a simple average of WTP values reported to avoid the risk of a 40% 
chance of losing 10 dollars.  Inspection of Figure 1 and Appendix 2 indicate that 16 (or 4.63%) 
of the OE observations exceeded the highest possible loss of $10v with six observations at $30 or 
higher.  These extreme, “irrational” values exert a strong influence on the mean and the variance 
of the OE responses, both of which are critical to the standard difference of means test.  
Following experimental economics standards that all values be retained, regardless of whether 
they appear irrational or not, Balistreri et al. used the entire data set in calculating the mean WTP 
of $4.58.  In making this decision, they note however, that the irrationally high “bids, as is 
typically done in CV studies might justifiably be trimmed” (p. 281). 
For demonstrative purposes, rather than dropping these observations entirely from the 
data set, we recoded these elevated values to the highest “rational” response of $10.  In this case 
the mean WTP falls to $3.88 (s.d = 2.61, n = 345).  This estimated mean is not significantly 
different from the expected value of $4 (t=0.84, p.0.40) nor is it different from the English 
Auction results (t=1.05, p.0.30).  It is however, marginally different than the Turnbull estimate 
(t=1.99, p.0.05).  Alternatively, in an effort to ensure comparability between elicitation formats, 
these extreme values might be recoded to $12, the highest value in the DC bid vector.  Under 
these conditions the estimated mean is $3.97, which is not significantly different from the 
expected value of $4 (t=0.17, p.0.87) nor the value obtained from the English Auction (t=1.42, 
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p.0.16).  This value is still marginally different than the Turnbull lower bound estimate (t=1.69, 
p.0.09), lying between the 5 and 10 percent level of significance.   
 
III. ON FUNCTIONAL FORM, ERROR DISTRIBUTIONS, AND WELFARE 
ESTIMATES 
 
Omission of relevant explanatory variables and misspecification of the functional 
relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory variables are common econometric 
problems that can lead to erroneous economic conclusions. The Monte Carlo results of HS 
illustrate this well-known finding in the specific context of DC-CV.  However, the algebraic 
model HS use to benchmark the degree of specification error is suspect. 
Our caution about applying the HS results stems from the fact that the algebraic model 
used by HS to demonstrate specification error is inconsistent with the structure of their Monte 
Carlo experiment.  By construction, their various preference specifications restrict the utility 
difference to be positive.   However, in some 924 of their 4800 cases “technically feasible but 
economically implausible…negative use values” did occur (p. 197).  As described in their 
footnote 18, such observations were deleted.  The potential problem with such a selected 
simulation approach arises because the linear logistic and probit models used in the subsequent 
HS analysis are unbounded, including possible negative values.  As pointed out by Haab and 
McConnell (1998) in the same issue of this journal, “if the distribution of WTP is known to have 
lower and upper bounds which are narrower than implied from the estimation, then the initial 
model is misspecified and the parallel estimates are inefficient, failing to use all the available 
information and inconsistent from assuming the wrong distribution of WTP” (p. 217).   As such, 
the HS demonstration of specification errors may itself be associated with the fact that they 
chose specifications that are not consistent with their underlying experimentvi. 
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Our concern here is whether a similar misspecification in the Balistreri et al. paper, 
wherein an unbounded linear logistic function was applied to data that was unambiguously non-
negative, could have led to erroneous rejections of equality between estimated mean WTP values 
from the DC and OE data.  To investigate this possibility we reestimate the DC-WTP 
relationship using specifications of the error term that are consistent with utility-theoretic 
restriction that the utility difference be non-negative (see Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999). In 
arriving at these estimates, the structure of the laboratory experiments precluded using many 
different specifications for the algebraic modelvii.  Hence, we restrict ourselves to an algebraic 
model that specifies the yes/no response choice as a function of a constant term and either the 
bid or the natural log of the bid.  Using logistic, normal and two-parameter Weibull error 
distributions, we further impose a theoretically desirable constraint on the upper bound of the 
estimated WTP distribution. Each experiment participant is (hypothetically) endowed with $80 
and so estimated WTP should fall at or below $80. However, based on OE responses, the upper 
bound of estimated WTP is likely to be closer to $40. We employ two approaches to imposing 
this upper bound restriction. First, we normalize/truncate the estimated cdf using the approach of 
Boyle, Welsh, and Bishop (1988). Second, we impose the restriction that an individual’s WTP 
lie between zero and $40 directly into the econometric model through a technique referred to as 
“pinching” (Ready and Hu, 1995). Finally, we abandon all algebraic model and error distribution 
assumptions and use Kriström’s (1990) nonparametric approach and the Turnbull lower bound 
estimate (see Haab and McConnell, 1997). Using linear interpolation, the upper bound for the 
Kriström nonparametric estimator is $15.60. The parameter estimates for the various 
specifications we explore are included as Appendix 2. 
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Overall, we obtain eleven different mean WTP estimates and report these values - along 
with the linear logistic and probit estimates - in Table 2. Standard errors and 95% confidence 
intervals for the parametric specifications are estimated using the Krinsky and Robb procedure 
with 10,000 random draws (see Park, Loomis, and Creel, 1991).  Standard errors and confidence 
intervals for the non-parametric specifications are calculated using formulas provided in the 
literature (Haab and McConnell, 1997).  Empirical distributions of mean WTP for the OE, 
English Auction, and non-parametric specifications were generated from the respective sample 
means and standard errors.  The convolutions method (Poe, Severance-Lossin, and Welsh, 1994) 
is used to conduct statistical tests under the null hypothesis that the mean WTP estimates from 
the raw OE data are equal to corresponding estimates obtained from the DC responses.   
As indicated in Table 2, the hypothesis of identical OE and DC mean WTP can be 
rejected for all specifications at the 5% significance level or greater, with the sole exception 
being the Turnbull lower bound estimate. Not surprisingly, all DC mean WTP estimates are 
statistically different than the English Auction estimates.  Note, in particular, that this 
bootstrapping of means approach corroborates the earlier parametric comparisons of Turnbull 
and English auction estimates. 
 
IV.  ON LOWER BOUND APPROACHES 
 
To this point we have merely used the statistics provided by HS and a reexamination of 
the Balistrei et al. data to refute the “statistical different” and “virtually identical” statements 
made by HS and to express our concerns about the Monte Carlo simulations.  Under a broad 
range of specifications we found that the HS claims cannot be supported.  The only instance in 
which equality does appear to hold across elicitation methods is when the most extreme lower 
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bound assumption regarding DC responses is made.  Here we raise particular concerns about this 
estimator and its increased use in CV. 
The application of the Turnbull lower bound approach in CV appears to have arisen out 
of “highly publicized damage assessment cases” (Haab and McConnell, 1997) and the 
corresponding desire to have a legalistically defendable, conservative estimate of hypothetical 
WTP (see Harrison and Kristrm, 1995).  Briefly, this estimator masses all the positive WTP 
responses at the corresponding DC value (for a more detailed presentation see Haab and 
McConnell, 1997), rather than assuming that the distribution of WTP includes values that lie 
between DC levels. 
Our hesitation towards the increased application of this method arises out a number of 
interrelated concerns.  First, while we agree that the Turnbull estimate is relatively transparent, 
uses only the information provided and could, perhaps, be regarded as the “minimum legal” 
WTP from implicit DC “contracts” between the researcher and the respondent (Harrison and 
Kriström, 1995), we maintain that the goal of CV should be to provide the best, rather than lower 
bound, estimate of WTP.  When hypothetical bias is found to exist, we argue that there is a 
greater need to explore how and why respondents provide answers that appear “inconsistent” 
with actual contributions instead of relying on technical, and as we demonstrate below somewhat 
arbitrary, econometric permutations to bring hypothetical DC values down to apparently 
reasonable levels.  That is, our efforts should be directed towards developing question formats 
that help respondents provide more realistic representations of their underlying WTP.  Some 
recent, promising modifications to the DC methods along these lines are presented by Champ et 
al. (1997), Poe and Welsh (1998), Cummings and Taylor (1999) and Ready, Navrud, and 
Dubourg (2001). 
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We also question the apparent equating of the terms “distribution free” and “assumption 
free” that occurs by some defenders of the Turnbull approach.  By massing points at the DC 
values rather than, say, assuming the values to be distributed between DC bids as was done by 
Kriström (1990), the modeler is making the rather strong assumption that all values can be 
massed at their corresponding DC bid function.  Examination of the OE WTP distribution in 
Figure 1 shows that such an assumption is counterfactual.  That making such an assumption 
grossly influences estimated mean values is demonstrated by applying the Turnbull lower bound 
estimator to the converted OE responses in Table 1.  Under these assumptionsviii the mean WTP 
value is estimated to be $3.25 (standard error = $0.25) which is lower than the mean WTP for the 
English Auction, but not significantly so (t=1.39, p.0.17).  However, in stark contrast to HS, 
imposing this parallel assumption on the OE data engenders a highly significant difference 
between the Turnbull lower bound DC estimate and OE mean WTP (t=3.30, p<0.01).   
Additional concern about using the Turnbull estimator as providing a lower bound 
estimate of WTP is that it is highly dependent upon the bid vector, a point raised in Haab and 
McConnell (1997) and empirically demonstrated here.  In turn this dependence “suggests caution 
with respect to absolute interpretations of the welfare measure” to be the lower bound estimate 
(Haab and McConnell, 1997, p. 259).  To demonstrate this point, we start with the full bid design 
used in Balistreri et al.ix, explore the effects on mean WTP associated with dropping one of the 
bid levels (and the corresponding responses) from the data set, and compare the resulting values 
with those obtained from the Kriström (1990) specification, which masses values equally across 
the bid interval, and a series of non-negative “pinched” parametric distributions.  The results 
from this exercise are provided in Table 3.  As shown, relative to the full bid vector the 
“jackknifed” bid vectors lower the Turnbull lower bound estimates for each alternative, 
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sometimes substantially.  In contrast, the corresponding measures of WTP derived from the 
Kriström and parametric approaches tend to vary around the full bid vector value and exhibit a 
lot less fluctuation.  Using the full bid vector as a reference point, the jackknifed Turnbull Lower 
Bound estimates exhibit a much higher mean squared error (0.30) on average than that of the 
Kriström (0.04) and the continuous parametric distributions (0.04 to 0.07).  As such, the near-
perfect alignment of the mean OE and the corresponding Turnbull estimate from DC responses 
appears to be a serendipitous result particular to the bid design used in Balistreri et al. 
In summary, we have substantial concerns about the estimator that HS used to support 
their not statistically significant and virtually identical claims, and broader concerns about the 
increased use of this estimator in CV research.  Adopting equal, counterfactual assumptions for 
the OE responses drives a wedge between the mean OE and DC estimates.  Further, Turnbull 
lower bound estimates are extremely dependent upon the bid vector, to the extent that they may 
be regarded as somewhat arbitrary values.  It appears that estimation methods that assume a 
continuity in values are less susceptible to changes in the bid structure. 
 
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the abstract of their paper, HS maintain that the “belief that discrete contingent 
valuation questions yield substantially larger estimates of the mean (and median) willingness to 
pay (WTP) for nonmarket resources is unfounded” (p. 186).  This claim is purportedly supported 
by their reassessment of the results from specific studies on elicitation effects. Drawing WTP 
values from known distributions, they then conduct Monte Carlo simulations to show that the 
degree of error associated with commonly used DC response functions can “easily span the 
differences between” OE and DC results (p. 200). 
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Using data from one study showcased by HS, we show that reasonable, and correct, 
statistical comparisons refute their statements that respecifications can provide DC values that 
are virtually identical to OE responses and not statistically different from actual WTP. While we 
applaud their efforts to demonstrate the importance of specification error and omitted variable 
bias in the estimating WTP, our close examination of the one data set that they use to support 
their claims and that is available to us, leads us to conclude that assuming simulated individuals 
and employing creative econometrics may provide some useful insights on the expected 
magnitude of the difference, but will not obviate the fundamental observation that a disparity 
occurs between DC and OE mean WTP values.  Human subjects reporting real and hypothetical 
values apparently demonstrate behavioral tendencies that lead to hypothetical bias and 
procedural variance.   Rather than assuming away these behaviors, a more promising research 
agenda would be to increase our understanding as to why these systematic differences occur and 
to develop elicitation methods that account for these sorts of variation. 
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Appendix 2. Parameter Estimates for Various Willingness to Pay Functions 
 
Distribution Constant 
(s.e.) 
Slope 
(s.e.) 
χ2 Log-L Pseudo R2 
Logistic 2.6876 
(0.2744) 
-0.4771 
(0.0501) 
144.97 -214.90 0.2522 
Log-Logistic 3.4234 
(0.4082) 
-2.1094 
(0.2441) 
144.83 -214.96 0.2520 
Pinched 
Logistic 
4.4199  
(0.7273) 
-2.4962 
(0.4178) 
148.04 -213.36 0.2576  
Weibull 2.9802  
(0.2906) 
-1.5641 
(0.1579) 
147.76  -213.50 0.2571 
Pinched 
Weibull 
3.5017  
(0.4139) 
-1.7269 
(0.2182) 
147.94 -213.41 0.2574  
Normal 1.5790 
0.1486 
-0.2763 
(0.0263) 
143.98 -215.39 0.2505 
Log-Normal 1.8604 
(0.1941) 
-1.1575  
(0.1172) 
141.77 -216.49 0.2467 
Pinched 
Normal 
2.7454 
(0.5268) 
-1.5472 
(0.2985) 
146.34 -214.21 0.2546 
 
  
Appendix 3.  Likelihood Functions and Coefficient Estimates for Various Parametric Forms Used 
in This Comment. (Note: Ui denotes the upper bound; Yi=1 if WTPi ≥ bidi): 
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Table 1: Results from the Dichotomous Choice Survey and Conversion of Open-Ended Responses 
to Dichotomous Choices 
 
Dichotomous Choice Converted Open-Ended  
 
Price 
 
Total Number of 
Observations 
 
Percentage that 
Accepted the Posted 
Price 
 
Average Number of 
Observations 
Average Percentage 
that Would have 
Accepted the Posted 
Price 
 
$1 
 
94 
 
93.62% 
 
77 
 
88.00% 
 
$4 
 
174 
 
67.82% 
 
143 
 
55.92% 
 
$6 
 
31 
 
32.26% 
 
25 
 
16.12% 
 
$8 
 
87 
 
24.14% 
 
71 
 
8.43% 
 
$12 
 
35 
 
11.43% 
 
29 
 
4.90% 
 
 
Source:  Taken from Table 3 in Balistreri et al., 2001. 
  
Table 2: Comparison of Mean and Median WTP Estimates 
 
Parametric Specifications, 
Assuming Non-Negativity 
Mean Std. 
Error 
95% 
C. I. 
Pr(= OE)c PR(=EA)d 
Log-logistic 
 
7.57 1.1837 [6.34, 10.56] <0.001 0.000e 
Truncated Log-logistic 
 
6.69 0.4008 [5.99, 7.55] <0.001 0.000e 
Pinched Log-logistic 
 
6.36 0.4417 [5.70, 7.42] <0.001 0.000e 
Log-normal 
 
7.25 0.8243 [6.15, 9.29] <0.001 0.000e 
Truncated Log-normal 
 
6.86 0.4595 [6.03, 7.82] <0.001 0.000e 
Pinched Log-normal 
 
6.27 0.4668 [5.62, 7.43] <0.001 0.000e 
Weibull 
 
6.04 0.3558 [5.46, 6.85] <0.001 0.000e 
Truncated Weibull 
 
6.04 0.3574 [5.46, 6.45] <0.001 0.000e 
Pinched Weibull 
 
6.60 0.4713 [5.88, 7.71] <0.001 0.000e 
Non-Parametric Specifications      
Kriström  
 
5.87 0.3150 [5.23, 6.48] 0.003 0.000e 
Turnbull 
 
4.56 0.3079 [3.96, 5.16] 0.961 0.009 
Parametric Specifications, 
Allowing for Negativity. 
     
Linear Logistic 
 
   Mean 
 
   Non-Negative Meana 
 
 
 
5.63  
 
5.77 
 
 
0.2640 
 
0.2672 
 
 
[5.14, 6.18] 
 
[5.30, 6.35] 
 
 
0.006 
 
0.002 
 
 
0.000e 
 
0.000e 
Linear Normal 
 
   Mean 
 
   Non-Negative Meanb 
 
 
5.72 
 
5.80 
 
 
 
0.2644 
 
0.2679 
 
 
[5.22, 6.26] 
 
[5.33, 6.38] 
 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
 
0.000e 
 
0.000e 
a  Non-negative mean calculated using formula in HS footnote 13. 
b Non-negative mean calculated using numerical integration. 
c  OE (open ended) values are mean=4.58, standard error=0.2894, 95% CI=[4.01, 5.15]. 
d EA (English Auction) values are mean=3.66, standard error=0.1595, 95% CI=[3.34, 3.97]. 
e The two vectors being compared do not overlap. 
  
Table 3: Mean Willingness to Pay Estimates  for Various Bid Vectors 
 
Data Description 
[Bid Vector] 
Turnbull   Kriström Pinched Log-
Logistic 
Pinched 
Weibull 
Pinched Log-
Normal 
Full Bid Vector 
[$1,$4,$6,$8,$12] 
4.56 5.87 6.36 6.60 6.27 
Jackknife Bid Vector 
[$1,$4,$6,$8] 
4.10 5.67 6.26 6.25 6.06 
Jackknife Bid Vector 
[$1,$4,$6,$12] 
4.30 5.89 6.58 6.96 6.62 
Jackknife Bid Vector 
[$1,$4,$8,$12] 
4.39 6.15 6.52 6.77 6.41 
Jackknife Bid Vector 
[$1,$6,$8,$12] 
3.49 5.60 6.04 6.32 5.92 
Jackknife Bid Vector 
[$4,$6,$8,$12] 
4.30 5.84 6.24 6.57 6.19 
Mean Squared Errora 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 
 
a  Using value for “Full Bid Vector” as the reference level.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Survival Functions (F($)): Raw Open-Ended, Open-
Ended at DC Thresholds, and DC
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  Footnotes 
 
                                                          
i HS cite an earlier working paper by Balistreri et al. in their study.  The difference between the two versions is largely 
editorial. 
 
ii Throughout, two-tailed tests and 5 percent levels of significance are used.   
 
iii The linear logistic function and the derivation of the mean WTP values from this function are provided in Footnote 13 in 
HS. 
 
iv In making this conversion Balistreri et al. sought to maintain independence in the converted OE responses across prices.  
To accomplish this, each OE value was allocated randomly to one of the five prices in a way that produced sample sizes 
proportional to the DC samples for each price.  It should be readily apparent that the results from such an exercise are 
dependent on the random allocation. To get a proportion at each price that was not dependent on a particular allocation, 100 
random allocations were used; the average proportions from these 100 allocations are reported in the last column of Table 1. 
 
v It is interesting to point out that no such irrationalities occurred in the actual money decisions made in the English Auction 
treatment.  This may be attributed to either the fact that the realities of actual money insured rationality, or that the group 
auction mechanism used provided information to otherwise irrational respondents, or both.   
 
vi   Interestingly, while HS show that the specification errors lead to differential mean squared errors in the Monte Carlo 
simulations, they do not indicate the direction that any bias would take.  
 
vii   In the laboratory experiment, the DC respondents all received the same (hypothetical) endowment from which to 
purchase insurance against an expected loss; there is also no differentiation between nonuse and use values; and, the 
participants are undergraduate students and as such constitute a more or less homogenous population with similar relative 
prices and income levels.  Hence, the Monte Carlo simulation results are irrelevant to our situation. 
 
viii Conceptually, we realize that the Turnbull lower bound estimator for the open-ended responses is simply that associated 
with the “continuous” survival function provided in Figure 1.  We use this term in the text simply to demonstrate our point. 
 
ix In introducing the Balistreri et al. paper, HS assert that this “study is notable in considering the importance of bid design 
for the performance of the [dichotomous choice] approach” (p. 190). 
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